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Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing of Retirement Payouts  
in Participating Life Annuities 
 
Life is a short affair; we should try to make it smooth, and free from strife. 
Euripides 
 
1. Introduction 
Life insurers are permitted to employ both accounting rules and actuarial techniques to 
transfer surpluses earned in good years to support benefit payouts to policyholders in bad years. To 
this end, insurers have a long history of reporting asset values at historical costs rather than fair 
market values in their financial statements, and assessing their liabilities using an actuarial rather 
than an alternative approach. Yet such smoothing techniques have come under fire of late, in part 
due to life insurers’ difficulties in the present low interest rate environment. Additionally, smoothing 
has been criticized for being nontransparent, making it difficult for shareholders, policyholders, and 
regulators to assess insurers’ financial status (Jorgensen 2004). Moreover, based on their study of a 
Danish pension saving product, Guillen, Jorgensen, and Nielsen (2006) concluded that “smoothing is 
an illusion,” providing no value to policyholders. Their result, however, limited to a product that 
provided no payouts until maturity; that is, benefits depended on the contract’s terminal value, but 
not on the particular return trajectory that led to this value. 
This paper explores how these smoothing techniques affect participating payout life 
annuities (PLAs), an increasingly popular product intended for the retirement market in Europe and 
North America (Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin 2013). Also called with-profit annuities, PLAs 
provide retirees with a guaranteed benefit for life, along with variable non-guaranteed payments that 
depend on investment returns and mortality experiences of the insurance pool. Accordingly, the 
particular return trajectory has immediate consequences for the benefit stream provided by the 
annuity. Our goal is to examine how the smoothing techniques employed by actuaries and 
accountants shape the risk and return profiles of PLA payout streams, as well as insurer profitability 
and solvency. 
Accounting smoothing in the insurance context values assets at historical cost rather than at 
fair market value; this practice helps shield insurer balance sheets and income statements against 
capital market volatility. Additionally, surpluses to be shared with policyholders are conventionally 
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computed using realized gains and losses. By contrast, those pressing for fair market valuation of 
insurer assets seek to determine and distribute surpluses generated by unrealized as well as realized 
gains and losses. Of course this introduces additional volatility into the insurer’s balance sheet, 
which could undermine insurer profitability and erase the appeal of retirement annuities. In addition 
to the accounting-related asset return smoothing, actuaries regularly smooth surplus payouts using a 
buffer fund on the liability side of the life insurer’s balance sheet, known as the contingency reserve 
position.  
For firms outside the insurance sector, international and general US accounting standards 
have moved from historical cost to fair market valuation, requiring that firms’ financial statements 
report both liabilities and assets at market values. According to US Financial Accounting Standard 
FAS 157, fair market values are measured as quoted prices from orderly transactions of identical 
assets in active markets, or on a mark-to-model approach.1 When assets are recorded at fair market 
values, unrealized gains and losses influence company balance sheets and can also impact their 
income statements. FMV proponents contend that mark-to-market prices improve transparency since 
they reflect current market conditions, depict the true financial status of the insurer, and provide an 
effective early warning mechanism for investors, creditors, and regulators (Bleck and Liu 2007). 
This allows capital providers to evaluate the ex-ante risk and return profile of a potential investment 
in the firm and to monitor the use of its capital by managers ex post (c.f., Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and 
Walther 2010). Opponents argue that FMV can be misleading for assets held to maturity, may not be 
reliable if based on model prices, and could lead to undesirable firm actions. In the context of banks, 
Allen and Carletti (2008) and Sapra (2008) argue that mark-to-market valuation of illiquid assets can 
result in fire sales, downward spirals, as well as contagion between financial institutions in a 
financial crisis. Heaton, Lucas, and McDonald (2010) show, in a general equilibrium context, how 
mark-to-market accounting can negatively impact the real economy during a financial crisis.2  
Despite the central importance of these actuarial and accounting rules for the life insurance 
industry, little has been written on the economic and financial impacts of these valuation approaches 
                                                            
1 A similar definition is used according to International Accounting Standards (IAS).  
2 Nevertheless Laux and Leuz (2010), using data on US banks, found no evidence that fair-value accounting 
created or exacerbated the severity of the 2008 financial crisis. 
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on annuitants and the insurance companies offering these policies. In point of fact, smoothing 
permits losses to be deferred, but when assets must be sold to pay the benefits (and losses realized), 
this can trigger large reductions in benefit payments and challenge firm solvency. Smoothing also 
defers gains, and when the gains are realized, benefits can increase due to the larger value of the 
contingency reserve. To analyze these behaviors, we develop a model of a participating life annuity 
to show how using historical cost versus fair market valuation of assets can shape outcomes, as well 
as a contingency fund for liabilities can shape both policyholder wellbeing and insurer profitability. 
We illustrate how such actuarial and accounting techniques can be welfare-enhancing, in that risk-
averse consumers may benefit substantially when insurers smooth asset and longevity surprises.  
Our paper is related to the debate in the accounting literature about the pros and cons of fair 
market value accounting (FMA) versus historical cost accounting (HCA). In the U.S., most life 
insurance companies follow statutory accounting principles recommended by National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which generally allow the recording of assets at historical 
costs.3 According to HCA, asset values are reported at purchase prices and updated later for 
amortization, but not for increases in market values (c.f., Laux and Leuz 2009, 2010). When market 
values decline, write-downs depend on how assets are classified in conjunction with an impairment 
test. For assets classified as “available for sale,” write-downs are required, while those classified as 
“held-to maturity” are only written down when declines are perceived as non-temporary. There is 
some discretion for the company to classify assets across these categories. Exactly how these 
practices affect insurer behavior is, as yet, not well understood. Ellul et al. (2013) provide empirical 
evidence that HCA led US insurers to engage in strategic trading during the financial crisis, seeking 
to protect their solvency capital.4 And the Society of Actuaries (2013) recently noted that smoothing 
methods are important for “what financial results get disclosed in terms of funding rules, reported 
values and statutory reporting.”5  
                                                            
3 For a comprehensive discussion of accounting for insurance companies see, e.g., Herget et al. (2008) and 
Lombardi (2009).  
4 Specifically, they concluded that life insurers sought to shore up capital by selectively sells assets with high 
unrealized gains, whereas property and casualty firms did not. 
5 While not our primary focus here, in a related discussion various authors continue to debate what interest rate 
should be used to discount guaranteed annuity payments from pension plans (c.f., Hann, Heflin, and 
Subramanayam 2007, Comprix and Muller 2011, Jorgensen 2004, Novy-Marx and Rauh 2011). 
4 
  
Our paper also builds on a growing literature regarding how households can use life 
annuities as retirement income instruments in a private accounts funded pension system.6 To date, 
however, these studies have focused mainly on the demand side, analyzing the welfare implications 
of having access to various types of life annuities and investigating when to optimally purchase life 
annuities.7 Few have examined the relationship between accounting and actuarial policies, and 
insurer supply of these products.8 Moreover, most studies of household portfolio choice and 
annuitization have focused on fixed payout annuities, where the insurer takes on all capital market as 
well as mortality risk. A few studies have evaluated investment-linked/unit-linked annuities where 
the insurer passes on the investment risk to the policyholder, and also the longevity risk can be 
shared between the annuitant and the insurer.9 Most interesting is the case of participating annuities, 
which offer retirees access to the mortality credit as well as a smoothed payout stream over their 
remaining lifetimes.  
In what follows, we provide a coherent analysis of PLAs from the perspective of the annuity 
purchaser and the insurer providing the annuity, and we examine how different accounting and 
actuarial rules influence results. Our goal is to show how these rules shape consumer utility and 
insurer profitability. To this end, we first discuss benefit smoothing within a stylized 2-period model. 
Subsequently, we develop a full-fledged, realistically calibrated stochastic asset-liability model of a 
life insurance company that offers a PLA, and we show how using historical cost versus fair market 
valuation of assets and maintaining a buffer fund influence both policyholder welfare and insurer 
profitability. The findings are likely to be of substantial interest to policymakers seeking to spur 
growth in the annuity market to enhance old-age security for those needing to manage their 401(k) 
plan drawdowns in retirement.10   
                                                            
6 Work in the area includes Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (2001), Davidoff, Brown, and 
Diamond (2005), Milevsky and Young (2007), Horneff, Maurer, and Rogalla (2010). 
7 Other researchers seek to explain why households seem not to annuitize much; see Inkman, Lopez, and 
Michaelidis (2011). 
8 In a recent paper, Koijen and Yogo (2013) study the impact of financial and regulatory frictions on the supply 
side of life insurance. 
9 See Piggott, Valdez, and Detzel (2005), Denuit, Haberman, and Renshaw (2011), Richter and Weber (2011), 
Maurer, Mitchell, Rogalla, and Kartashov (2013).  
10 For instance Mark Iwry, senior adviser to the US Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for retirement and health policy, has stated that “[o]ne solution is to provide for a predictable lifetime stream of 
income, such as an annuity provided under a retirement plan or IRA. By pooling those who live shorter and 
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2. A Stylized Model of Participating Life Annuity with Payout Smoothing 
2.1 Setup 
To fix ideas, we first devise a simple 2-period model of a stylized PLA to illustrate the 
circumstances under which smoothing annuity payouts over time can increase annuitants’ lifetime 
utility and add value to the insurer. The model setup is as follows: at time ݐ ൌ 0, an individual 
purchases a PLA that, in the absence of payout smoothing, promises to pay the value of one fund 
unit (FU) at time ݐ ൌ 1 and ݐ ൌ 2, subject to the annuitant being alive.11 For notational convenience, 
we assume that the individual survives to ݐ ൌ 1 with certainty and to ݐ ൌ 2 with probability ݌. Under 
this assumption, and based on the actuarial equivalence principle, the premium charged by the 
insurer per PLA sold amounts to ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሻܵ଴, where ܵ଴ is the value of one FU at time ݐ ൌ 0. On 
selling the PLA to ܰ annuitants, the insurer’s initial reserves amount to ܰ ⋅ ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሻ FUs. Due to 
benefit payouts, these reserves will decrease by ܰ FUs at time ݐ ൌ 1, and by ܰ ⋅ ݌ FUs at time ݐ ൌ
2, leaving the insurer with depleted reserves at the end of the model horizon.12 
As time progresses, the FU value changes according to a binomial process: each period, it 
can either increase or decrease by a proportional factor ݑ or ݀. Consequently at time ݐ ൌ 1, the FUs 
may be worth either ܵ௨ ൌ ݑ ⋅ ܵ଴ or ܵௗ ൌ ݀ ⋅ ܵ଴, while at time ݐ ൌ 2, their value may be ܵ௨௨ ൌ
ݑଶ ⋅ ܵ଴, ܵ௨ௗ ൌ ݑ݀ ⋅ ܵ଴, ܵௗ௨ ൌ ݀ݑ ⋅ ܵ଴, or ܵௗௗ ൌ ݀ଶ ⋅ ܵ଴. Since PLA payouts are denominated in FUs, 
these price fluctuations (capital market movements) directly affect benefits paid to annuitants. By 
contrast, the insurer is not at risk because capital market risk is hedged by investing the collected 
premiums into the FUs underlying the PLA.  
To mitigate the impact of FU price risk on annuity payouts, we now introduce a smoothing 
factor ݕ	ሺ∈ ሾ0; 1ሿሻ, representing the fraction of a FU that is deducted from (added to) the regular 
payout every time the FU value has increased (decreased) in the prior period. If, for example, the FU 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
longer than average, everybody can essentially put away what’s necessary to reach the average life expectancy, 
and those who live longer than average will be protected.” (Steverman, 2012). 
11 Fund Units may represent a mutual fund or a single asset such as a stock. Hence, our model PLA can also be 
regarded as a unit-linked annuity. As we restrict our analysis to a 2-period model, we posit that the annuitant 
does not live to ݐ ൌ 3. 
12 This requires a sufficiently large number ܰ of annuitants, such that the insurer can perfectly eliminate 
individual longevity risks through pooling. Moreover, this requires that the survival probability ݌ is 
deterministic and known at time ݐ ൌ 0. Hence, we abstract from systematic mortality risk. 
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value increased to ܵ௨ at ݐ ൌ 1, the annuitant receives a payout of only ሺ1 െ ݕሻ FUs, worth ሺ1 െ ݕሻ ⋅
ܵ௨. If, on the other hand, the FU value decreased to ܵௗ, the annuitant receives a payout of ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ 
FUs, worth ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ⋅ ܵௗ. Correspondingly, at time ൌ 2,  if the FU value increases from ܵ௨ to ܵ௨௨, the 
payout is ሺ1 െ ݕሻܵ௨௨. Any FUs not paid out after a price increase are retained by the insurer, while  
the insurer must cover the additional payouts triggered by price drops. Figure 1 summarizes the 
alternative developments of the FU price and the corresponding evolution of annuity payouts and 
reserves held by the insurer after payouts are made. 
Figure 1 here 
This smoothing process reduces payout volatility, although it also reduces the expected 
benefit since the value of the FUs withheld in good states exceeds the value of the additional FUs 
received in bad states. From the annuitant’s perspective, this may be appealing depending on the 
utility-maximizing smoothing factor	ݕ. Concurrently, the insurer’s position is no longer risk-free. 
That is, in the absence of smoothing (i.e. ݕ ൌ 0ሻ, the insurer’s reserves are always depleted after the 
final annuity payouts have been made. With smoothing, however, the insurer will either have some 
FUs left or be some FUs short at time ݐ ൌ 2, depending on how the capital market develops. Hence, 
from the perspective of the insurer, the question is whether the potential gains from retaining some 
FUs in up-states compensate sufficiently for the risk taken. 
2.2 Deriving the Optimal Smoothing Factor 
Next we take the annuitant’s perspective and derive the smoothing factor ݕ that maximizes 
utility. To this end, we posit that the annuitant’s preferences can be described by a time-separable 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) lifetime utility function defined over consumption:  
 ܷ଴ ൌ ܧ଴గ ቈߚ ⋅ ܥଵ
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ ൅ ߚ
ଶ ⋅ ݌ ⋅ ܥଶ
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ቉, (1) 
with consumption ܥଵ	ሺܥଶሻ at time 	ݐ ൌ 1	ሺݐ ൌ 2ሻ equal to the PLA payouts, a coefficient ߛ of relative 
risk aversion, a time preference of ߚ, and a probability of survival of ݌ to ݐ ൌ 2. Here, ܧ଴గ is the 
expectation at time ݐ ൌ 0 under the subjective probability measure ߨ, with ߨ௨	ሺߨௗ ൌ 1 െ ߨ௨ሻ 
representing the subjective probability for an increase (decrease) in FU prices. 
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Substituting the PLA payout stream described in Figure 1 into the lifetime utility function 
and maximizing it with respect to the smoothing factor ݕ, we get:13   
 ݕ ൌ ܣ
ଵ
ఊ െ ܤ
ଵ
ఊ
ܣ
ଵ
ఊ ൅ ܤ
ଵ
ఊ
 (2a) 
with 
ܣ ൌ ݀ଵିఊ ∙ ൫ߨௗ ൅ ߚ ⋅ ݌ ሺݑଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ௗ ൅ ݀ଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗଶሻ൯ 
ܤ ൌ ݑଵିఊ ∙ ൫ߨ௨ ൅ ߚ ⋅ ݌ ሺݑଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ଶ ൅ ݀ଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ௨ሻ൯. 
(2b) 
If ܣ ൐ ܤ, the smoothing factor ݕ is positive, i.e. smoothing will increase utility. For risk-averse 
investors with a typical coefficient of relative risk aversion of ߛ ൐ 1, smoothing will be appealing 
when the subjective probability for a market downturn (ߨௗ) and/or the volatility of FU prices (i.e. the 
difference between ݑ and ݀) are sufficiently high. In these situations, the potential utility loss from a 
capital market downturn cannot be compensated by the possible utility gain resulting from an 
increase in FU prices. Hence the annuitant will be willing to give up some upside potential as 
insurance against adverse capital market developments, as we will discuss more fully below.  
Turning to the insurer’s perspective, we next identify the smoothing factor that maximizes 
the value for the PLA provider. The insurer’s gains/losses from smoothing PLA payouts depend on 
the number and value of the FUs remaining at time ݐ ൌ 2 (see Figure 1). This payoff profile 
resembles a complex derivative strategy, a combination of two path-dependent options, which can be 
replicated by a dynamically rebalanced portfolio of the risky asset and (risk-free) cash. 
Consequently, it can be priced using risk-neutral valuation. Following this approach, it can easily be 
shown that the value ܸܫ଴ the insurer receives from payoff smoothing is given by: 
ܸܫ଴ ൌ 	ܰሺ1 ൅ ݌ሻܵ଴ ⋅ ሾݍ
ଶ ⋅ ݑଶ െ ሺ 1 െ ݍሻଶ ⋅ ݀ଶሿ
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻଶ ⋅ ݕ, (3) 
with risk-free interest rate ݅ and a risk-neutral probability of an upward jump ݍ. The value generated 
for the insurer is a linear function of the smoothing factor ݕ; it is increasing in the smoothing factor 
                                                            
13 See Appendix A for details. 
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as long as the term in the squared brackets is positive. This is the case as long as the following 
relation between ݑ and ݀ holds:14  
 
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ⋅ ݑ
2ݑ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൐ ݀. (4) 
The insurer profits from rising FU prices, since more valuable FUs will be retained. Hence 
the gains increase with the probability that FU prices increase. At the same time, higher FU price 
volatility (i.e. the difference between ݑ and ݀) will also increase the insurer’s profit, inasmuch as the 
value of potential FU subsidies decreases when the value of potential FU withholdings increases. 
In summary, this example shows that PLA payout smoothing adds value to both annuitant 
and insurer, as long as certain restrictions are met with respect to possible capital market 
developments, and as long as the annuitant believes that FU prices will drop with a particular 
probability.  
2.3 Numerical Example 
To provide additional insight into the conditions under which smoothing is beneficial, as 
well as the magnitude of the optimal smoothing factor, we next use reasonable calibrations for the 
parameters involved to evaluate analytical solutions for the framework just laid out. We assume that 
the annuitant has a time preference rate of ߚ ൌ 0.96. The probability of survival to ݐ ൌ 2 is set to 
݌ ൌ 0.8, which is approximately the 10-year survival probability of a US male aged 65 in 2013. 
With respect to the capital market, we study two calibrations: a lower volatility regime with ݑ ൌ 1.2, 
and a higher volatility regime with ݑ ൌ 1.3 (in both cases ݀ ൌ 1/ݑ). The first value corresponds to 
the development of annual total returns on the S&P 500 over the period 1981 through 2012, while 
the second value focuses on the recent financial crisis and limits the calibration period to 2008 
through 2012. 
We seek to determine the subjective threshold probability of a market downturn ߨௗ∗  , beyond 
which smoothing will be beneficial for the annuitant. To find this threshold, we equate ܣ and ܤ in 
Equation (2b) and solve for the subjective probability. Figure 2 presents the results for a range of risk 
aversion values ߛ and the two capital market specifications discussed above. 
                                                            
14 Under the typical assumption ݀ ൌ 1/ݑ, this inequality is always fulfilled (see Hull 2000, ch. 9.7, for details 
on how to calibrate a binomial model to historical data). 
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Figure 2 here 
As one would expect, the threshold probability is decreasing in the level of risk aversion. If 
payout smoothing is to increase utility, an annuitant with a low risk aversion of ߛ ൌ 2 must believe 
that markets will drop with a probability of around 40% or more. Conversely, a very risk averse 
annuitant with ߛ ൌ 10 benefits from smoothing even if he believes that there is a 95% probability 
that the markets will go up. With ߛ ൌ 5, our baseline calibration in subsequent analyses, the 
annuitant has a threshold probability of ߨௗ∗ ൌ 18.9%	ሺ10.9%ሻ in the low (high) volatility regime 
with ݑ ൌ 1.2	ሺ1.3ሻ.  
Table 1 presents utility-maximizing smoothing factors ݕ, the corresponding welfare gains for 
the annuitant, and the profits the insurer can generate by offering such a PLA. We show these for our 
two capital market calibrations for individuals with low, medium, and high risk aversion (ߛ ൌ
2, 5,	and 10), and for two subjective probabilities of market downturns (ߨௗ ൌ 0.2 and 0.5). These 
latter probabilities are derived by calibrating our binomial model to historical returns on the S&P500, 
with the probability of 20% (50%) corresponding to observations over the period 1981 (2008) 
through 2012. 
Table 1 here 
Results in Table 1 show that our baseline annuitant with medium risk aversion will optimally 
chose a PLA with a smoothing factor of 0.7%, when he faces both low volatility and a low 
probability of a market downturn. This results in a small welfare gain of about one basis point, 
measured in terms of an increase in the certainty-equivalent fixed life annuity. An insurer offering 
such a PLA can generate a profit in the amount of 0.1% of the PLA premium. As indicated in Figure 
2, the subjective market downturn probability of 20% is only marginally above the threshold value 
beyond which smoothing is beneficial, which explains the modest amount of smoothing in this case. 
If, by contrast, the individual is exposed to a capital market having higher volatility and a higher 
(subjective) probability of a market downturn, he will elect a PLA with a much larger smoothing 
factor, 20.7%. In other words, the annuitant would be willing to forfeit one-fifth of his benefit in 
good times, so as to have his payout increased by the same fraction when markets go down. Such a 
PLA generates a welfare gain of about 9.5% and a profit for the insurer of 2.7% of the annuity 
10 
  
premium. Not surprisingly, in all scenarios, more risk averse individuals choose a higher level of 
smoothing. While the less risk averse do not demand smoothing in a normal capital market 
environment, in a high volatility scenario such as the present, they prefer a substantial smoothing 
factor of 13% for a welfare increase of 1.7 percent.  
This simplified two-period model illustrates how PLA payout smoothing can be beneficial 
for both the annuitant and the insurer, where benefit payments are linked to the value of the 
underlying fund units meaning capital market risk is smoothed. Nevertheless we have not yet 
considered mortality risk, so next we turn to a more complete framework. This extends our model to 
incorporate mortality, and to generalize it to more periods and more assets. Most importantly, we 
allow two methods of smoothing using both actuarial and accounting techniques, and we examine 
their tradeoffs. To this we turn next. 
 
3.  Analyzing a More Complex Participating Life Annuity Contract  
3.1 Setup and Product Design 
To illustrate how payout smoothing works in a more realistic setting, we construct a model 
of a stylized life-insurance company that sells single premium participating life annuity contracts. In 
addition to realistic accounting and actuarial smoothing techniques, we incorporate capital market 
risk, and systematic as well as idiosyncratic mortality risk. Our stylized product model is closely 
modeled on the TIAA Traditional Annuity offered by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), one of the most important life 
insurance companies operating in the US market.15  
The product we model is a participating life annuity (PLA) which provides retirees with 
lifetime guaranteed benefits plus non-guaranteed surplus payments.16 To price the guaranteed 
benefits, the company uses a specific mortality table in combination with an assumed interest rate to 
                                                            
15 In 2012, TIAA-CREF supervised 3.6 million annuity contracts and managed assets of $487B. In the 
European market, participating life annuity products are offered comparable to the TIAA product outlined in 
the text; see Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin (2013) for a detailed discussion. 
16 The TIAA Traditional Annuity also builds up capital during the accumulation phase, whereby contributions 
paid by policyholders earn a minimum guaranteed yearly interest rate (depending on the vintage when 
premiums are paid) plus a non-guaranteed surplus. Here we concentrate only on the liquidation phase of the 
product.  
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discount benefits (also called the guaranteed interest rate). The non-guaranteed surplus is determined 
annually by the insurer’s Board of Trustees as a percentage of the guaranteed benefit and paid to 
annuitants the following year. The potential to generate surpluses stems from two sources: the 
insurer’s experience on investment returns, and the realized annuitant pool mortality. When the 
return on the insurer’s asset portfolio backing the liability due to promised annuity benefits exceeds 
the guaranteed interest rate, and/or if realized annuitant mortality is higher than expected, the 
insurance company earns a surplus. The company can influence the expected risk and return profile 
of uncertain surplus payments by its choice of assets in its portfolio. In addition, the insurance 
company can smooth the policyholder surpluses. To this end, accounting smoothing based on 
accounting standards, and actuarial smoothing based on building up reserves, both play central roles. 
Accounting smoothing arises from the fact that unrealized gains and losses on assets are not 
used to calculate the investment return used to specify policyholder surpluses. In the U.S., most life 
insurance companies follow statutory accounting principles recommended by National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These are specific accounting guidelines for insurers which 
permit the companies to value their bond portfolios in their annual statements using the historical 
cost approach. That is, these assets are recorded at their prices when purchased, and values are not 
updated for (non-credit related) changes in market values as long as they are unrealized.17  
Actuarial smoothing results from withholding a part of the surplus earned in good years to 
support surplus payments in bad years. To this end, the insurer is permitted to build a special position 
on the liability side of its balance sheet, the so-called contingency reserve. Allocations into and 
withdrawals from the contingency reserve are governed by the insurer’s Board of Trustees with 
guidance from the firm’s actuaries. 
In what follows, we introduce our realistically-calibrated company model for a pool of PLA 
policyholders with uncertain capital markets and mortality dynamics incorporating the above 
mentioned institutional features. Our goal is to spell out the implications of these various smoothing 
                                                            
17 See Lombardi (2009) for further details on valuation requirements. Also, under NAIC rules, insurers may 
discount the liabilities resulting from the guaranteed benefit with a fixed interest rate specified at the beginning 
of the contract (i.e. the guaranteed interest rate). See for instance TIAA-CREF (2011). 
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techniques from the perspective of the policyholder (i.e. the benefit stream) and the life insurance 
company (i.e., profitability and solvency), within such a realistic setting. 
3.2 The Insurance Provider  
We assume that the insurance company sells PLA contracts paying guaranteed lifetime 
benefits ܩܤ to ܫ଴ individuals of the same age ݔ (i.e. the pool is closed after the sale). The premium ௧ܲ 
per contract paid at time ݐ is calculated according to: 
Here ݌௫஺௞ ൌ ∏ ሺ1 െ ݍ௫ା௜஺ ሻ௞ିଵ௜ୀ଴ 	 is the k-period survival probability at age ݔ, the ݍ௫஺ are actuarial 
mortality rates used in the industry, and ߱ is the terminal age of the mortality table. ܩܫܴ refers to the 
firm’s guaranteed interest rate.18  To reflect the guaranteed annuity payment obligations, the 
insurance company builds a special reserve position on the liability side of its balance sheet, called 
the actuarial reserve. At time ݐ ൌ 0, the actuarial reserve is equal to the total premium collected, i.e. 
଴ܸ ൌ ଴ܲ ⋅ ܫ଴. Multiplying the surviving number of annuitants ܫ௧ by the present value of remaining 
benefits, given in equation (5), describes the evolution of the actuarial reserve in subsequent years, 
௧ܸ ൌ ௧ܲ ⋅ ܫ௧. 
The insurer invests the total premium collected into a portfolio of dividend-paying stocks 
and bonds paying coupons. This portfolio is recorded as the General Account on the asset side of the 
balance sheet of the insurance company, and at ݐ ൌ 0	,	it is equal to the actuarial reserve. At the 
beginning of each subsequent year, the insurance company pays annuitant benefits from asset 
income (dividends/coupons) and from assets sold at market prices. The stochastic dynamics of the 
market prices of stocks are governed by a geometric random walk with drift and the evolution of 
bond prices is driven by a 3-Factor CIR term structure model (see Appendix B). 
Depending on the insurer’s investment and mortality experience, annuitants may receive 
surplus payments in addition to their guaranteed benefit. This surplus is generated when the insurer’s 
total investment return exceeds the ܩܫܴ, and/or when actual policyholder mortality exceeds that 
                                                            
18 Here and throughout the analysis, we disregard explicit costs in terms of loadings, as these are not critical to 
our model. 
 
௧ܲ ൌ ܩܤ ⋅ ෍ ௞݌௫ା௧
஺
ሺ1 ൅ ܩܫܴሻ௞
ఠିሺ௫ା௧ሻ
௞ୀ଴
.  (5) 
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assumed when the annuity was price. The determination of the actual surplus generated by the 
insurer and, hence, the amounts paid out to annuitants, depend on a complex set of rules specified by 
the insurance company, to which we turn next. 
The total annual surplus ܶܵ௧ generated by the insurer is given by: 
where the mortality surplus is ܯܵ௧ and ܣܵ௧	refers to the asset surplus. The mortality surplus arises 
from the difference between realized and anticipated mortality in the annuitant pool. Formally, the 
mortality surplus is calculated as: 
where ௧ܸ is the actuarial reserve for the surviving annuitants. ܫ௧ represents the stochastic number of 
living annuitants at time ݐ , is given by: 
Here, ܫ௧௜ represents an indicator variable ܫ௧௜ which takes the value of one if the annuitant ݅	ሺ݅ ൌ
1,… , ݊; 	݊ ൌ ܫ଴ሻ is alive at time ݐ, and 0 if the annuitant has died. Over time, the sequence of 
indicator variables ܫ௧௜ for each annuitant ݅ forms a Markov chain with: 
where ݍ௫ା௧௉  is the actual mortality rate of annuitants of age ݔ at time ݐ. Actual mortality rates can 
differ from those used to price the PLA, as they are stochastic; their dynamics are modeled as in 
Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2006) (see also Appendix B). Accordingly our model incorporates both 
idiosyncratic longevity risk (uncertainty about individual lifetimes), and also systematic longevity 
risk (uncertainty about the mortality table). 
 ܶܵ௧ ൌ ܯܵ௧ ൅ ܣܵ௧,  (6) 
 ܯܵ௧ ൌ ௧ܸାଵ ⋅ ൬ܫ௧ െ ܫ௧ାଵܫ௧ െ ݍ௫ା௧
஺ ൰, (7) 
 
ܫ௧ ൌ ෍ܫ௧௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
. (8) 
ܲ൫ܫ௧ାଵ௜ ൌ 1หܫ௧௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 1 െ ݍ௫ା௧௉ ൌ ݌௫ା௧௉ , 
ܲ൫ܫ௧ାଵ௜ ൌ 0หܫ௧௜ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ݍ௫ା௧௉ , (9) 
ܲ൫ܫ௧ାଵ௜ ൌ 0หܫ௧௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 1 ,   
14 
  
The insurer’s asset surplus naturally depends on the stochastic dynamics of the underlying 
stock/bond portfolio, and also on how the insurer values the assets. The relevant valuation method is 
determined by the accounting category into which each asset is classified. According to US 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, three asset categories are allowable: assets held to 
maturity, assets held for trading purposes, and assets available for sale (see e.g., Herget et al. 2008). 
Assets held to maturity are valued at amortized cost when acquired (historical cost valuation, or 
HCV); in this case, changes in asset prices are only recognized as gains or losses when the 
instruments are sold. Assets held for trading purposes are reported at fair market value (FMV), so 
price changes immediately affect the insurer’s profits whether or not they are realized.19 Assets 
available for sale are also reported at FMV, yet unrealized gains and losses resulting from market 
price fluctuations are not stated in the insurer’s profit and loss statement (P&L). Instead, they are 
carried in a separate account on the liability side of the insurer’s balance sheet, known as the Other 
Comprehensive Income account (OCI). When these assets are sold, the OCI account is reversed, and 
realized gains or losses are recorded in the P&L.  
Formally, when using FMV, the insurer’s investment return on stocks, ݅௧ௌ,ிெ௏ and on bonds, 
݅௧஻,ிெ௏, is given by: 
where ݊஻,௧ (݊ௌ,௧) denotes the number of bond fund units (stocks) held in year ݐ; ܤ௧ (ܵ௧) refers to the 
price of the bond fund unit (stock) at time t;  ܥ௧ (ܦ௧ሻ is the coupon (dividend) payment received on 
each bond fund unit (stock); and ܮ௧ represents payments to individual annuitants. As indicated 
above, ܸݐ is the actuarial reserve, and	ܫ௧ is the number of policyholders in the pool.   
Under the historical cost valuation method (or the other comprehensive income valuation 
approach), the corresponding returns ݅௧ௌ,ு஼௏ and ݅௧஻,ு஼௏ are calculated as: 
                                                            
19 Under USGAAP, the default category of bonds (stocks) refers to those available for sale (held for trading) 
purposes. By contrast, under NAIC accounting, bonds are classified as held to maturity by default. 
݅௧ௌ,ிெ௏ ൌ 	
݊ௌ,௧ିଵ ⋅ ሺܵ௧ െ ܵ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݊ௌ,௧ ⋅ ܦ௧
ሺ ௧ܸ െ ܫ௧ ⋅ ܮ௧ሻ  (10a) 
݅௧஻,ிெ௏ ൌ 	
݊஻,௧ିଵ ⋅ ሺܤ௧ െ ܤ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ݊஻,௧ ⋅ ܥ௧
ሺ ௧ܸ െ ܫ௧ ⋅ ܮ௧ሻ  (10b) 
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with ൫݊ௌ,௧ିଵ െ ݊ௌ,௧൯ the number of stocks sold, and ൫݊஻,௧ିଵ െ ݊஻,௧൯	the number of bond units sold. 
According to the OCI approach, unrealized gains and losses from price fluctuations are neutralized 
using the OCI account, which develops according to ܱܥܫ௧ ൌ ܱܥܫ௧ିଵ ൅	݊ௌ,௧ିଵ ⋅ ሺܵ௧ െ 	ܵ௧ିଵሻ ൅
݊஻,௧ିଵ ⋅ ሺܤ௧ െ	ܤ௧ିଵሻ	where ܱܥܫ଴ ൌ 0. Therefore, investment returns are given by equations (11a) 
and (11b).  
To some extent, life insurers may choose between the various valuation methods for their 
asset holdings. Naturally their choices have consequences for the asset surplus of the participating 
annuity. To study the impact of categorizing assets into different accounting valuation regimes, we 
define two parameters, ߙௌ and ߙ஻, that specify the fraction of stocks and bonds valued using HCV 
(or OCI). Given those ratios and asset returns, the insurer’s realized total investment return ݅௧் ை்஺௅ is 
calculated as: 
Based on realized total investment returns, the firm’s asset surplus for the pool is determined by: 
After the period’s total surplus, ܶܵ௧, is determined, it must be distributed among annuitants 
and the insurer. To this end, we posit that the annuitants receive a fixed allocation percentage ܽ݌ 
subject to several constraints. Since the insurance company guarantees lifelong minimum benefits, 
policyholders do not participate in negative surpluses. Consequently negative surpluses directly 
decrease the insurer’s equity capital. In addition, the level of surplus depends on the insurer’s 
solvency capital, which includes three components: the insurer´s equity capital, the value of its OCI 
account, and its contingency reserve. When the insurer’s solvency capital exceeds a pre-specified 
solvency limit, an amount ܽ݌ ⋅ ܶܵ௧ is allocated to the policyholders; consequently, the insurance 
݅௧ௌ,ு஼௏ ൌ
൫݊ௌ,௧ିଵ െ ݊ௌ,௧൯ ⋅ ሺܵ௧ െ ܵ଴ሻ ൅ ݊ௌ,௧ ⋅ ܦ௧
ሺ ௧ܸ െ ܫ௧ ⋅ ܮ௧ሻ  (11a) 
݅௧஻,ு஼௏ ൌ
൫݊஻,௧ିଵ െ ݊஻,௧൯ ⋅ ሺܤ௧ െ ܤ଴ሻ ൅ ݊஻,௧ ⋅ ܥ௧
ሺ ௧ܸ െ ܫ௧ ⋅ ܮ௧ሻ  (11b) 
 ݅௧் ை்஺௅ ൌ 		 ሺ1 െ ߙௌሻ ⋅ ݅௧ௌ,ிெ௏ ൅ ߙௌ ⋅ ݅௧ௌ,ு஼௏ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙ஻ሻ ⋅ ݅௧஻,ிெ௏ ൅ ߙ஻ ⋅ ݅௧஻,ு஼௏. (12) 
 ܣܵ௧ ൌ ሺ ௧ܸ െ ܫ௧ ⋅ ܮ௧ሻ ∙ ሺ݅௧் ை்஺௅ െ ܩܫܴሻ. (13) 
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company keeps ሺ1 െ ܽ݌ሻ ⋅ ܶܵ௧ of the surplus. When the insurer’s solvency capital falls below the 
limit, we posit that ܽ݌ is reduced by 50%, i.e. only 0.5 ⋅ ܽ݌ ⋅ ܶܵ௧ is allocated to the annuitants. The 
insurer thus retains the total surplus if no equity capital remains.20 Accordingly, the portion of total 
surplus allocated to policyholders, ܦܵ௧, is given by: 
where ܧ௧ is the insurer´s equity, ܱܥܫ௧ is the value of the OCI account, and ݏ݈ is the solvency limit, 
defined here as a fraction of the actuarial reserve. The surplus ܦܵ௧ is allocated to the contingency 
reserve ܥܴ௧. 
Next, the insurance company must determine how much surplus to pay to the annuitants, 
defined as ܲܵ௧, and how much to retain in the contingency reserve. Typically this decision is made 
by the firm’s Board of Trustees and informed by the insurer’s chief actuary; the goal is to smooth 
annuitant payouts over time, given each year’s realized surplus and the level of the contingency 
reserve. While the specifics of the decision process are not formally prescribed, we can characterize 
it using an algorithm which embodies both a backward- and a forward-looking component. By the 
backward-looking component, the current payout should be set in such a way that it is as similar as 
possible to the previous year’s payout. The forward-looking element seeks to preserve this surplus 
stability in future years as well; this is implemented by maintaining a certain target level of the 
contingency reserve. To balance these two, the insurer will determine ܲܵ௧ such that the following 
objective function is maximized: 
where 
 
                                                            
20 We posit that the annuity provider is part of an insurance group, so if the annuity provider’s equity capital 
drops below zero, the parent company brings additional equity capital to pay guaranteed benefits. This 
precludes the need for us to take on the computational burden of modeling the consequences of formal 
insolvency. 
ܦܵ௧ ൌ 	 ൝
max	ሺ0; ܽ݌ ∙ ܶܵ௧ሻ ,
max	ሺ0; 0.5	 ∙ ܽ݌ ∙ ܶܵ௧ሻ0	,
,
݂݅ ܧ௧ ൅ ܱܥܫ௧ ൅ ܥܴ௧ ൐ ݏ݈ ∙ ௧ܸ ܽ݊݀ ܧ௧ ൒ 0
݂݅ ܧ௧ ൅ ܱܥܫ௧ ൅ ܥܴ௧ ൑ ݏ݈ ∙ ௧ܸ ܽ݊݀ ܧ௧ ൒ 0
݂݅ ܧ௧ ൏ 0
 (14) 
 max௉ௌ೟ ݂ሺܲܵ௧ሻ ൅ ݃ሺܥܴ௧ሻ  (15a) 
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The objective function is concave and it has two terms, the polynomials ݂ and ݃. Both 
functions depend on the endogenous variable ܲܵ௧ and reach their maximum when the expressions 
within all parentheses are equal to one. Moreover, function ݂	depends on two components. The term 
ܲܵ௧ ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝⁄  seeks to keep annuitants’ surplus payouts as close as possible to the previous period’s 
level, where ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝ is the previous period’s surplus payout adjusted for the change in the size of the 
annuitant cohort ሺ	ܫ௧ ܫ௧ିଵሻ⁄ . The term ൫ܦܵ௧ െ 	ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝൯ ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝ൗ  penalizes (rewards) the withholding of 
current realized surplus from annuitants when ܦܵ௧	is higher (lower) than	ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝. In other words, 
when the current surplus falls below (is above) last year’s payout, the firm has an incentive to reduce 
(increase) payouts. To avoid extreme fluctuations in the surplus payouts, the surplus may vary only 
within a predefined boundary (equation 15d). For example, if ܾ ൌ 1.25, the minimum (maximum) 
payout to each annuitant in the current year is 80% (125%) of last year’s payout.  
Function ݃ is intended to sustain the insurer’s ability to pay stable future surpluses. It 
reaches its maximum when the contingency reserve ܥܴ௧ equals the target value ܥܴ௧௔௜௠, where the 
latter is a fraction of the current actuarial reserve. Inserting the transition equation (15e) into (15c) 
shows that the insurer withdraws from the contingency reserve when its previous level exceeds the 
target, i.e. ܲܵ௧ ൐ ܦܵ௧ if ܥܴ௧ିଵ ൐ ܥܴ௧௔௜௠. 
The interaction between the terms ݂ and ݃ reflects the tradeoff between paying 
policyholders more today, versus maintaining the insurer’s stability for the future. In a period of high 
 
݂ሺܲܵ௧ሻ ൌ 	െቆ ܲܵ௧ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝
െ ܦܵ௧ െ ܲܵ௧ିଵ
௔ௗ௝
ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝
ቇ
ଶ
൅ 2ቆ ܲܵ௧ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝
െ ܦܵ௧ െ ܲܵ௧ିଵ
௔ௗ௝
ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝
ቇ (15b) 
 ݃ሺܥܴ௧ሻ ൌ െ ቆ ܥܴ௧ܥܴ௧௔௜௠ቇ
ସ
൅ 4 ⋅ ቆ ܥܴ௧ܥܴ௧௔௜௠ቇ െ 2 
(15c) 
 ܲܵ௧
ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝
∈ ቈ1ܾ ; ܾ ቉ , ܾ ൒ 1 (15d) 
 ܥܴ௧ ൌ ܥܴ௧ିଵ ൅ ܦܵ௧ െ ܲܵ௧ , ܥܴ௧ ൒ 0 (15e) 
 ܲܵ௧ିଵ௔ௗ௝ ൌ ܲܵ௧ିଵ
ܫ௧
ܫ௧ିଵ
 
(15f) 
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surplus, the ݂ function would call for increased benefit payments, but this will only be realized when 
the contingency reserve is high enough (according to the ݃ function). But if the contingency reserve 
is too low, the ݃ function inhibits the call for benefit increases. Conversely, in a period of low 
surplus, benefits would be reduced according to the ݂ function, unless a sufficiently high level of the 
contingency reserve encourages the insurer to maintain or even increase the benefit level. 
Finally, the insurer’s next year equity capital develops according to: 
where ܴሺݐ, 1ሻ is the 1-year government bond spot rate, and ߤܦ is the dividend rate paid to 
shareholders. The dividend is only paid if the insurer’s next year solvency capital is adequate. 
3.3 The Policyholder  
To quantify how individuals with different risk aversion and time preferences value the 
stochastic PLA income stream, we use an expected utility framework as in Section 2. Specifically, 
policyholder preferences are modeled using a time additive constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
utility function as follows: 
Here ߛ denotes the consumer’s coefficient of relative risk aversion and the discount factor ߚ < 1 
represents the individual’s subjective time preference. Following Maurer, Rogalla, and Siegelin 
(2013), the expected lifetime utility	ܷ from the PLA benefit stream is transformed into a utility-
equivalent fixed life annuity ܧܣ: 
The EA can be interpreted as the constant guaranteed lifetime income stream that the annuitant will 
require to give up the upside potential of a PLA with stochastic surpluses. 
 
ܧ௧ାଵ ൌ ቊൣܧ௧ ∙ ൫1 ൅ ܴ
ሺݐ, 1ሻ൯ ൅ ሺܶܵ௧ െ ܦܵ௧ሻ൧ ∙ ሺ1 െ ߤ஽ሻ,
ܧ௧ ∙ ൫1 ൅ ܴሺݐ, 1ሻ൯ ൅ ሺܶܵ௧ െ ܦܵ௧ሻ,
݂݅ ܧ௧ାଵ ൅ ܱܥܫ௧ାଵ ൅ ܥܴ௧ ൐ ݏ݈	 ∙ ௧ܸାଵ
݈݁ݏ݁ 	 (16) 
 
ܷ ൌ ܧቌ෍ ߚ௧௧݌௫௉
ఠି௫
௧ୀ଴
ܮ௧ሺଵିఊሻ
1 െ ߛ ቍ . (17) 
 
ܧܣ ൌ ቈ ܷ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ∑ ߚ௧௧݌௫௉ఠି௫௧ୀ଴
቉
ଵ
ሺଵିఊሻ. (18) 
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4 Numerical Evaluation  
4.1 Setup and Calibration 
Next we describe the impact of actuarial and accounting smoothing on PLA policyholder 
utility and insurer profitability. We do so by simulating 5,000 independent sample paths of an insurer 
selling the PLA described above to a cohort of 10,000 males age 65 in 2013. Our goal is to compare 
the outcome for two cases: the first where surpluses are smoothed using the historical cost approach 
(accounting smoothing), and the second where assets are evaluating using historical costs and where 
actuarial reserves for liabilities are accumulated (accounting and actuarial smoothing).  
We model a PLA paying a guaranteed lifetime benefit of $10,000 per year. Premiums for 
guaranteed benefits as well as the actuarial reserve in later years are calculated using an interest rate 
of 3% per year (similar to the TIAA Traditional Annuity), and the Annuity 2000 mortality table 
recommended by the Society of Actuaries with an age shift of four years. These assumptions imply a 
single premium per contract of $163,399. In addition to the guaranteed benefits, the insurer promises 
to pay surpluses to the annuitants as described above. The surplus allocation parameter specifying 
how annuitants participate in total surpluses is assumed to be ܽ݌	 ൌ 	90%. The surplus paid to 
policyholders in the first year is set to 2% of the guaranteed benefit. Also we assume that the 
company has equity capital worth 4% of the actuarial reserves, which we set as the solvency limit in 
equation (14).21   
Next we describe the firm’s initial balance sheet. The liability side includes the actuarial 
reserve, the contingency reserve, and the firm’s equity capital. Without actuarial smoothing, the 
initial and targeted values of the contingency reserve are set to 0%. With actuarial smoothing, the 
initial contingency reserve is set to 5% of the actuarial reserve and the target contingency reserve is 
set to 10%.22 Assets backing the actuarial reserve are held in the general account and invested in a 
constant-mix portfolio of stocks and bonds with a target duration of 10 years. The asset side also 
                                                            
21 In doing so, we are informed by TIAA-CREF’s 2011 financial statement which reported equity capital of 
$2B and an actuarial reserve of $175B (page 6). In addition TIAA-CREF reported valuation reserves (i.e. the 
difference between fair market minus book/adjusted carrying value), which increases the effective equity 
capital substantially. Since the initial valuation reserve in our model is zero, we adjust for this using a higher 
equity capital ratio. 
22 The TIAA-CREF 2011 financial statement reported a contingency reserve ($23B) worth 13% of the actuarial 
reserve ($175B; page 6).  
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includes a cash account corresponding to the contingency reserve and the insurer’s equity capital. 
This earns an interest rate equal to the one-year spot rate given by the term structure model (see 
Appendix B). 
Using our simulation results, we calculate the equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA) which 
would provide the same lifetime utility as the PLA. In our base case we stipulate a relative risk 
aversion of ߛ ൌ 5 and a time preference factor of ߚ ൌ 0.96; these are subsequently varied in 
sensitivity analyses. The policyholder’s subjective survival probabilities ݌௧ ௫	௉  are derived as in 
Appendix B. To explore the impact of actuarial and accounting techniques on annuitants’ benefits 
and firm profitability, we permit the firm to select its asset allocation and choice of accounting 
method. To this end, we vary the asset allocation in the general account from all bonds to all stocks, 
and the valuation approach from all assets at historical cost (HCV Ratio ߙௌ ൌ ߙ஻ ൌ 100%), to all 
assets at fair market (HCV Ratio  ߙௌ ൌ ߙ஻ ൌ 0%), all in 10% steps. In sensitivity analysis, we also 
allow for bonds to be valued according to the OCI instead of the HCV approach.   
4.2 The Annuitant’s Perspective 
Figure 3 shows how alternative smoothing approaches influence annuitant wellbeing. Panel 
A involves only accounting smoothing but not actuarial smoothing; Panel B adds in actuarial 
smoothing. The graph on the left of each Panel depicts the benefit that a fixed life annuity (FLA) 
must pay so as to generate the same utility as the PLA with a guaranteed benefit of $10,000 plus a 
variable surplus, for a range of asset allocations. The solid line reflects FLA values under HCV 
accounting, while the dotted line reflects the range of FLAs under fair market valuation. On the right, 
we illustrate the utility impact of permitting intermediate or blended accounting regimes, combining 
HCV and FMV in different proportions, again for a range of asset allocations.     
Figure 3 here 
Specifically, when the insurer invests only in bonds, the FLA is worth 8% more under full 
HCV accounting than under the FMV methord ($12,300 vs. $11,400; see Panel A1). Similar utility 
increases are observed for other asset allocations. In other words, if the only smoothing being 
undertaken is attributable to the accounting approach, historical cost valuation dominates fair market 
valuation from the annuitant’s perspective.  Moreover, utility rises as the fraction in bonds increases, 
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but it turns down after about 70 percent. This holds regardless of the accounting rule: that is, 
diversification is beneficial, independent of the valuation approach selected.   
In Panel A2, we see that the utility-equivalent FLA surface generally slopes upward as more 
assets are valued using the HCV approach, given a specific bond percentage. This is because using a 
higher HCV fraction lowers capital market volatility and thus generates a smoother surplus payout 
stream, which the policyholder prefers. Nevertheless, using only HCV is suboptimal because returns 
resulting from asset price appreciation are not immediately allocated to the surplus, which reduces 
the annuitant’s payout. This is particularly relevant for stocks whose major source of return is asset 
price appreciation. Consequently, it is preferable to account for at least some of the portfolio using 
fair market valuation rules. For our base case with ߛ ൌ 5, the annuitant’s optimal outcome would be 
for the insurer to hold 40 percent in bonds and use historical cost valuation for 80 percent of the 
assets, yielding a utility level equivalent to that of a fixed life annuity of almost $13,000.  
Panel B illustrates how the annuitant’s perspective changes when the insurer can smooth 
using both accounting and actuarial methods. For a given portfolio allocation, Panel B1 shows that 
the utility equivalent outcomes are now more similar between the HCV and the FMV approaches. 
Compared to Panel A1, FMV plus actuarial smoothing results in utility increases of about 5%, 
independent of asset allocation. This is because the actuarial smoothing dampens the surplus 
volatility introduced by FMV. By contrast, with the HCV approach, adding actuarial smoothing 
results in lower utility with an all-bond allocation by about 2%, and by about 4% for an all-stock 
allocation. In other words, too much smoothing is not preferred by the PLA policyholder. Focusing 
last on the two curves in Panel B1, neither valuation regime clearly dominates. When the actuary 
removes substantial volatility via smoothing, the annuitant will prefer a higher stock fraction as 
compared to the case without actuarial smoothing. 
As before, Panel B2 confirms that the utility-equivalent FLA surface rises as more assets are 
valued using the HCV approach, given a particular bond percentage. Yet the accounting regime now 
has less of an impact on utility levels than before. There is again an interior maximum to the surface: 
in our base case with ߛ ൌ 5, the annuitant would like the insurer to hold 60 percent in bonds and use 
historical cost valuation for 70 percent of the assets, yielding a utility level equivalent to that of a 
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fixed life annuity of almost $12,300. The higher fraction in bonds does curtail surplus volatility, but 
it also reduces earnings potential; moreover, actuarial smoothing shifts some of the surplus into the 
future, which is also detrimental to utility. The somewhat lower HCV fraction partly offsets these 
effects, but not by enough to generate utility comparable to that in Panel A2.  
Table 2 also presents additional optimal utility equivalent FLAs for alternative values of risk 
aversion. We find the expected result, namely that when only accounting smoothing is available, the 
policyholder prefers both a higher bond fraction and a higher HCV ratio with increasing risk 
aversion. Including actuarial smoothing boosts the bond percent with no change in the HCV fraction, 
confirming our earlier finding that the valuation technique selected matters less in the case of 
actuarial smoothing. Finally, for all risk aversion values examined, when actuarial smoothing is in 
place, the policyholder can tolerate a higher share of assets valued at fair market. 
Table 2 here 
4.3 The Insurer’s Perspective  
Next we assess the insurer’s perspective regarding asset valuation and smoothing methods. 
To this end, we calculate the internal rate of return (IRR) on capital provided by the insurer’s 
shareholders for each simulation run. This computation accounts for the initial investment, along 
with periodic dividend payments. In addition, it includes what investors receive at the end of the 
product’s lifespan, namely the value of equity capital, contingency reserve, and any actuarial 
reserves that remain when the last annuitant dies. We also consider the shortfall probability of the 
insurer, defined as the percent of times that equity capital is negative when the last policyholder dies. 
The time horizon for each simulation run varies depending on when the last annuitant is gone (a 
stochastic event). 
Figure 4 plots the internal rate of return and shortfall probability as a function of the 
insurer’s asset allocation and the accounting regime in place. Panel A presents results for the 
accounting smoothing alone, while Panel B reports findings where both the accounting and actuarial 
smoothing techniques are in force. For alternative asset allocations, Panel A1 plots the expected IRR 
for the two polar cases of the pure historical cost versus pure fair market accounting regimes. Clearly 
HCV dominates FMV in terms of IRR for all portfolio allocations. Additionally, the HCV produces 
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positive expected IRRs in the range of 3-4 percent, whereas the FMV generates expected IRRs of -10 
percent for an all-stock allocation, to -0.5 percent for an all-bond portfolio; the IRR is marginally 
positive in the middle-range bond allocation. 
Figure 4 here 
Panel A2 depicts how the expected internal return responds to alternative combinations of 
bonds and historical cost versus fair value accounting. Expected IRRs are increasing in the HCV 
ratio, a finding that holds for all asset allocation patterns. This occurs since unrealized surpluses must 
be paid out to the annuitants under FMV, while the insurer must bear unrealized losses which are not 
passed on to policyholders. By contrast, under HCV, unrealized losses from periods of bad 
performance are offset by unrealized surpluses from good performance, thus producing a smoothed 
impact on payouts. Such fluctuations reduce the value of the options held by annuitants. Moreover, 
IRRs are also generally rising with the percentage of the portfolio held in bonds, due to their more 
constant payment streams. 
Finally, the shading in Figure 4 provides information about the insurer’s shortfall 
probability, with darker areas representing more risk. Not surprisingly, holding an all-stock 
allocation along with the FMV approach is associated with a 20-25 percent shortfall probability; the 
insurer’s equity capital would then be zero or negative. Moving toward a pure historical cost 
valuation, as well as to more bonds, substantially reduces the shortfall risk (to 0%).  
Panel A3 reports additional information about the development of the shortfall risk over 
time, illustrating the four cases of 100 percent bonds/all HCV, 100 percent stocks/all HCV, 100 
percent bonds/all FMV, and 100 percent stocks/all FMV. Under both FMV scenarios, the insurer is 
exposed to substantial shortfall risk (over 30 percent) early in the retirement phase, which declines 
thereafter. Specifically, with the all-bond (all-stock) portfolio, the shortfall risk under fair market 
value falls after about year 2, and falls to about 5 (10) percent in the long term. Under the HCV/all-
bond allocation, there is no shortfall risk, whereas the HCV/all-stock combination provides an 
intermediate level (around 10 percent) of shortfall risk that peaks at 7-10 years and fades away 
thereafter. Also, under the HCV, an all-stock portfolio has the same shortfall risk as an all-bond 
portfolio under FMV. This underscores the strength of the smoothing approach under HCV: that is, 
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in terms of shortfall risk, requiring an insurer to move from historical cost to fair market valuation 
has the same impact as requiring the insurer to hold only equity.  
Turning to Panel B, where both accounting and actuarial smoothing are available, we note 
that the shapes of the expected IRR curves are similar to those presented in Panel A.  Under the 
historical cost method depicted in Panel B1, expected returns are again positive for all portfolio 
allocations. By contrast, under FMV, the curve is more concave than before. The impact of adding 
actuarial smoothing is that funds must be set aside in a contingency reserve owned by the 
policyholders until the last annuitant dies; at that juncture, remaining assets are paid out to investors. 
This results in higher IRRs for the investor, as can be seen when the firm holds a high bond 
allocation.  
Despite this general tendency, in the FMV scenario with actuarial intervention, the insurer 
holding all stocks receives a large negative expected IRR (-15 percent). With the actuary in place, by 
contrast, benefit payments are less directly linked to capital market performance; consequently, 
annuity payouts can be much higher than in the asset-smoothing only case. In particular, benefits are 
less likely to be reduced in bad times, which in turn diminishes investors’ eventual claims. This is 
particularly likely when the portfolio allocation is heavy in stocks and it can offset the investor’s 
opportunity to retain the contingency reserve.  
Comparing Panels A2-B2 and A3-B3, we note that shortfall probabilities under the all-
stock/FMV scenario are even higher than without actuarial smoothing, and they do not decline as 
much with the passage of time. Thus with the all-stock portfolio, the shortfall risk under fair market 
value stands at about 17 percent in the long term, compared to 10 percent without actuarial 
smoothing. In other words, we conclude that under the historic cost approach, insurer stability and 
expected IRRs perform do better if the firm holds mostly bonds. That is, fair market valuation 
reduces stability and expected IRRs. Moreover, when the insurer holds mostly bonds, incorporating 
actuarial smoothing raises expected IRRs and offers some degree of protection for investors in terms 
of expected IRRs and shortfall risk.  
To show that investors would find acceptable the utility-maximizing combinations of bond 
percentages and HCV ratios reported in Table 2, we summarize in Table 3 the corresponding 
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expected IRRs, their volatilities, and shortfall probabilities. Overall, expected IRRs are moderately 
positive and shortfall probabilities are acceptably low. For example, given moderately risk-averse 
policyholders, accounting smoothing alone produces an expected IRR of 3.61 percent and shortfall 
probability of 1.58 percent; with actuarial smoothing, these values are 4.85 percent and 0.75 
respectively. A similar pattern holds for other risk aversion patterns, except when very low risk 
aversion can produce a very high stock allocation.  
Table 3 here  
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
To this point, we have modeled insurers as having the freedom to value their assets 
according to either HCF or FMV principles. In fact, however, regulators usually set standards for 
asset valuation practices. For example, the NAIC requires that bonds be valued according to the 
HCV approach by default, and stocks according to FMV. Accordingly, asset allocation will drive the 
insurer’s valuation approach. Additionally, in addition to the HCF and FMV approaches, yet a 
different accounting valuation technique can also be used by life insurance companies if the latter 
issue securities on the stock exchange (as per the Securities and Exchange Commission).23 Known as 
the Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) approach, this is the default approach for bonds under US 
GAAP.24 Under OCI, assets are reported on the balance sheet using fair market valuation, while 
unrealized gains/losses are not reported on the P&L statement but rather tracked in the OCI account.  
Using the OCI approach produces identical investment returns as under HCM and hence the 
amount of surplus generated, but the two approaches differ with respect to the distribution of 
surpluses. This is because unrealized gains and losses recorded in the OCI account are part of the 
insurer’s solvency capital, which influences the level of total surplus that can be allocated to 
policyholders according to equation (14). Thus, for instance, if the OCI account were sufficiently 
negative (positive), surplus distributions to annuitants could be reduced (increased). In what follows, 
we explore how our key results change when the insurer adopts OCI valuation instead of the 
alternatives.  
                                                            
23 Specifically, the SEC seeks to insure that firm financial reports confirm to US GAAP so as to inform 
investors. By contrast, the purpose of the statutory accounting principles under NAIC guidelines is to protect 
insurer solvency.  
24 Stocks require fair market valuation. 
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Figure 5 depicts how these alternative approaches influence both policyholder and insurer 
outcomes, with Panel A illustrating the impact of the accounting smoothing alone, while Panel B 
reflects what happens after adding actuarial smoothing. The three black lines (solid, dotted, and 
dashed) in the Figure illustrate what happens when all of the assets are evaluated according to a 
single valuation rule. The two red lines (solid and dashed) indicate results when stocks are valued at 
FMV, and bonds according either to HCM (the NAIC default) or OCI (the US GAAP default).  
Figure 5 here  
It is not surprising that the (red) utility-equivalent value curves of the affected annuity 
policyholder under the two mixture approaches lie between the two extremes previously discussed 
(Figure 3, Panel A1). When no actuarial smoothing is in effect, the fixed lifetime annuity (FLA) 
under OCI (dotted black line) is worth around 3% more than with FMV, for the full range of 
portfolio allocations. Despite the fact that unrealized gains/losses do not directly affect surplus under 
OCI, losses do reduce the insurer’s equity and through this channel may reduce the allocation of 
surplus to the annuitant. This explains why the utility-equivalent FLA is lower than under pure HCV 
(solid black line). If US GAAP defaults are in effect (dotted red line), stocks are fair market valued 
while bonds are valued using OCI. Consequently, at low bond allocations, US GAAP and FMV 
produce the same outcomes; by contrast, with high bond fractions, US GAAP valuations are similar 
to those with OCI. We observe similar results for NAIC valuation (solid red line): for a low bond 
allocation, results are similar to FMV, while at a high bond percent the pattern tracks that of the 
HCV approach. Under the NAIC approach (solid red line), results for low bond allocations are 
similar to the FMV outcome, but for higher allocations, the annuitant’s utility equivalent is close to 
that under the HCV. Moreover, the NAIC technique provides more value to the annuitant than under 
the US GAAP methodology, because the former protects the policyholder from asset volatility with 
additional smoothing.  
Turning to the insurer’s perspective, Panel A2 makes clear that OCI (dashed black line) 
generates expected IRRs above those flowing from historical cost valuation (solid black line) for 
most portfolio allocations. This is because under OCI, as described above, even unrealized losses 
may reduce the surplus distributed and hence benefit payments. In turn, the investor retains more 
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equity capital which reduces the need for shareholders to provide additional capital injections; this 
produces a higher expected IRR. By contrast, the insurer strongly disfavors the FMV approach 
(black dotted line), which produces negative expected returns across all portfolio allocations. For the 
US GAAP, the expected IRR curve (dashed red line) is a weighted average of the FMV and OCI 
approaches; for the NAIC curve (solid red line), the result is a weighted average of FMV and HCV. 
Overall, expected insurer profitability will be somewhat higher under US GAAP treatment compared 
to the NAIC approach, for realistic bond exposures. That is, there is a tension between the 
policyholder’s preferred valuation method and that favored by the insurer. 
Panel B indicates the impact of adding actuarial smoothing to the mix, and overall the results 
are quite similar. A comparison of Panels A1 and B1 shows that the additional smoothing provided 
by the actuary has relatively little impact on utility, for low equity exposures; if the insurer were to 
hold a riskier portfolio, the actuary’s extra smoothing is slightly welfare-enhancing. Once again, 
annuitants see the NAIC technique as more appealing than US GAAP; actuarial smoothing has little 
marginal impact. Turning to the firm, a comparison of Panels B1 and B2 indicates that the expected 
IRR is higher with than without the actuary (for reasonable bond allocations25). Also, as before, 
insurer profitability is higher under US GAAP than NAIC for realistic bond exposures. Hence again 
there is a tension between the policyholder’s preferred valuation method and that favored by the 
insurer. 
Figure 6 illustrates how the key outcomes depend as a function of surplus fraction attributed 
to annuitants (ܽ݌). All results are based on the asset allocation and book value ratio that maximizes 
the annuitant’s utility. The solid line depicts utility-equivalent FLA values (left axis), while the 
dashed line (right axis) illustrates expected IRRs, as we vary ܽ݌ from 0.8 to 1.0 (around the 0.9 base 
case above). First, and somewhat surprisingly, annuitant values are relatively insensitive to variations 
in ܽ݌. The reason is that attributing high values of the surplus to annuitants leaves the insurer unduly 
exposed to capital market shocks; this in turn increases the chance that surplus allocations will be cut 
to avoid insolvency, in which case the annuitants may end up with lower benefits. Second, the 
                                                            
25 For example, TIAA-CREF (2011, page 6) holds about 85% of its assets in fixed income calculated as 
follows: bonds ($168B) plus mortgages and contract loans ($14.5B) plus cash ($0.6B) divided by total 
admitted assets ($226B) less separate account assets ($16B). 
28 
  
insurer’s expected IRR is much more responsive, dropping from 6 to 1.5 percent, as the portion of 
surplus dedicated to the annuitant rises. In other words, for reasonable sharing rates and assuming 
actuarial intervention, smoothing using mostly historical cost valuation is preferable to fair market 
valuation.26  
Figure 6 here 
To summarize, this section confirms that accounting smoothing is appealing to the annuitant 
and, for reasonable bond allocations, to the insurer as well. The insurer finds attractive high bond 
exposures along with historical cost value accounting, as this combination helps stabilize returns and 
reduce the cost of the guarantee issued to policyholders. Such a conservative investment and 
valuation approach is also congruent with policyholder preferences, since annuitants favor stable 
payout profiles. Adding actuarial smoothing techniques improves the insurer’s profitability and 
solvency situation, given a realistic bond fraction and FMV accounting. Yet an approach that stresses 
more fair market valuation such as OCI will be unattractive to the annuitant. 
  
5 Conclusions 
A participating payout annuity can be a very attractive mechanism to provide retirees a 
guaranteed benefit plus some upside potential in the form of surplus sharing, while handling 
systematic shocks to mortality tables, capital market uncertainty, and default risk. Our paper 
develops a realistically-calibrated model of such a product to investigate how alternative accounting 
and actuarial valuation techniques can influence policyholder welfare as well as insurer profitability 
and stability. Our main contribution is to study how two different smoothing mechanisms shape 
policyholder and insurer outcomes, to help illuminate the current public debate about whether to 
push insurance companies to undertake fair market valuation. We show that smoothing reduces 
volatility without subtracting the expected returns from holding equity; consequently, smoothing is 
economically attractive to risk-averse annuitants and affordable for insurers. In this sense, smoothing 
is not simply an illusion in the insurance context.  
                                                            
26 In results not detailed here, we also conclude that the preferred bond fraction is in the range of 0.6-0.7. 
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Using a simple two-period illustrative model, we showed how PLA payout smoothing can 
add value to both annuitant and insurer. Next, a more complex approach examined how insurers can 
use accounting and actuarial techniques to smooth reporting with the goal of transferring surpluses 
earned in good years to support benefit payouts in bad years. Nevertheless with such smoothing, 
investors and policyholders are hard-pressed to perceive an insurer’s true financial status. 
Accordingly, the practice has prompted calls for fair market valuation in insurance company’s 
balance sheets. Yet this also introduces additional volatility which could undermine insurer 
profitability and the appeal of retirement annuities.  
Our findings should be of considerable current interest, since insurance company valuation 
techniques have been charged in the press with being nontransparent and potentially conducive to 
insurer instability. Moreover, international accounting standards are moving away from historical 
cost accounting toward a fair value approach, requiring that companies report both liabilities and 
assets at market values. While this movement will enhance reporting to those seeking to buy 
insurance company shares, curtailing smoothing also threatens policyholders seeking the protection 
associated with long-term PLA retirement products. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Equations (2) and (3) 
The CRRA lifetime utility function describing the annuitant´s preferences is given by 
 ܷ଴ ൌ ܧ଴గ ቈߚ ∙ ܥଵ
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ ൅ ߚ
ଶ ∙ ݌ ܥଶ
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ቉. (A1) 
where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is ߛ, the rate of time preference is ߚ, the probability of 
survival to ݐ ൌ 2	ሺݐ ൌ 1ሻ of ݌	ሺ1ሻ, and the expectation ܧ଴గat time ݐ ൌ 0 under the subjective 
probability measure ߨ. The realization and the probability of the consumption ܥଵ	ሺܥଶሻ at time ݐ ൌ 1 
ሺݐ ൌ 2ሻ  are as follows: 
ܥଵ ൌ ൜ሺ1 െ ݕሻ ⋅ ݑܵ଴ with	probability ߨ௨ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ⋅ ݀ܵ଴ with	probability ߨௗ ൌ 1 െ ߨ௨ and (A2) 
ܥଶ ൌ
ۖە
۔
ۖۓሺ1 െ ݕሻ ⋅ ݑଶܵ଴ with	probability ߨ௨ଶሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ⋅ ݑ݀ܵ଴ with	probability ߨ௨ௗ
ሺ1 െ ݕሻ ⋅ ݀ݑܵ଴ with	probability ߨௗ௨
ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ⋅ ݀ଶܵ଴ with	probability ߨௗଶ
  (A3) 
where ߨ௨	ሺߨௗ ൌ 1 െ ߨ௨ሻ measures the subjective probability for an increase (decrease). Next we 
factor out ߚ/ሺ1 െ ߛሻ and replace the expected consumption by its realization and probability: 
ܷ଴ ൌ ߚ1 െ ߛ	ሼ	ሾሺ1 െ ݕሻ	ݑܵ଴ሿ
ଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ ൅ ሾሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ	݀ܵ଴ሿଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ ൅ ߚ݌	ሺ	ሾ	ሺ1 െ ݕሻ	ݑଶܵ଴ሿଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ଶ 		
൅ ሾሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ	ݑ݀ܵ଴ሿଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ௗ ൅ ሾሺ1 െ ݕሻ	݀ݑܵ଴ሿଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ௨ ൅ ሾሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ	݀ଶܵ଴ሿଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗଶ	ሻሽ 
Rearranging terms we get: 
ܷ଴ ൌ ߚ1 െ ߛ ⋅ ܵ଴
ଵିఊ ቄ	ሺ1 െ ݕሻଵିఊ ⋅ ቀݑଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ ൅ ߚ݌ ⋅ ൫ݑଶሺଵିఊሻ ⋅ ߨ௨ଶ ൅ ሺ݀ݑሻଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ௨൯ቁ 																							
൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻଵିఊ ⋅ ቀ݀ଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ ൅ ߚ݌ ⋅ ൫ሺݑ݀ሻଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ௗ ൅ ݀ଶሺଵିఊሻ ⋅ ߨௗଶ൯ቁ	ቅ 
Therefore: 
 ܷ଴ ൌ ߚ1 െ ߛ ⋅ ܵ0
1െߛሼሺ1 െ ݕሻଵିఊ ⋅ ܤ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻଵିఊ ⋅ ܣሽ (A4) 
with 
 ܣ ൌ ݀ଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ ൅ ߚ݌൫ݑ݀ଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ௗ ൅ ݀ଶሺଵିఊሻ ⋅ ߨௗଶ൯ (A5a) 
 ܤ ൌ ݑଵିఊ ⋅ ߨ௨ ൅ ߚ݌൫ݑଶሺଵିఊሻ ⋅ ߨ௨ଶ ൅ ݀ݑଵିఊ ⋅ ߨௗ௨൯. (A5b) 
Calculating the derivative of ܷ଴ with respect to ݕ and setting it equal to zero gives us: 
 ܷ݀଴
݀ݔ ൌ
ߚ ⋅ ܵ01െߛ
1 െ ߛ ሼെሺ1 െ ߛሻ ⋅ ሺ1 െ ݕሻ
ିఊ ⋅ ܤ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ⋅ ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻିఊ ⋅ ܣሽ ൌ 0 (A6) 
െሺ1 െ ݕሻିఊ ⋅ ܤ ൅ ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻିఊ ⋅ ܣ ൌ 0 
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Solving for the smoothing factor ݕ yields: 
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ଵ
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ଵ
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ఊ ൅ ܤ
ଵ
ఊ
 (A7) 
The value ܸܫ଴ of the PLA for the insurer is given by:  
 VI଴ ൌ 	Nሺ1 ൅ pሻS଴ ⋅ ሾq
ଶ ⋅ uଶ െ ሺ 1 െ qሻଶ ⋅ dଶሿ
ሺ1 ൅ iሻଶ ⋅ y, (A8) 
with the risk-neutral probability of an upward jump ݍ and the riskless interest rate	݅. ܵ଴ and ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሻ 
are positive variables. Consequently, the value of the insurer is a linear function of the smoothing 
parameter ݕ if: 
 ݍଶ ⋅ ݑଶ ൐ ሺ1 െ ݍሻଶ ⋅ ݀ଶ or ݍ ൐ ݀ݑ ൅ ݀ . (A9) 
Replacing  ݍ with its definition ሺሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ െ ݀ሻ/ሺݑ െ ݀ሻ gives us the following result: 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ െ ݀
ݑ െ ݀ ൐
݀
ݑ ൅ ݀ (A10) 
We rearrange terms and assume ݑ ൐ ݀ ൐ 0: 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ⋅ ሺݑ ൅ ݀ሻ െ ݀ሺݑ ൅ ݀ሻ ൐ ݀ሺݑ െ ݀ሻ (A11) 
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻݑ	 ൐ 2݀ݑ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ݀ 
ݑ
݀ ൐
2ݑ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ
1 ൅ ݅  
Since ݑ	 ൐ 	1 ൅ ݅ by definition, finally we can solve for ݀: 
 ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻݑ
2ݑ െ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ ൐ ݀ (A12) 
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Appendix B: Capital Market and Mortality Model 
The portfolio of our life insurance company includes a stock and a bond fund. The stochastic 
dynamics of the bond fund are modeled using a multi-factor CIR model of the term structure as 
described in Chen and Scott (1993). In this model, the short rate ݎܥܫܴ is the sum of ܭ independent 
state variables: 
 ݎ஼ூோ ൌ෍ݎ௜஼ூோ
௄
௜ୀଵ
 (B1) 
Each of the state variables followings a CIR-type square root diffusion process: 
 ݀ݎ௜஼ூோ 	ൌ 	 ሺߤ௜஼ூோ –ߙ௜ ⋅ ݎ௜஼ூோሻ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ௜஼ூோටݎ௜஼ூோ݀ ௜ܹ, (B2) 
where ߙ௜ ,	ߤ௜஼ூோ, and ߪ௜஼ூோare positive constants and ݎ௜஼ூோ 	൐ 	0, if 	ߤ௜஼ூோ 	൐ 	 ሺߪ௜஼ூோሻଶ	. ௜ܹ are 
independent Wiener processes. 
The term structure of interest rates has an affine structure and is described by: 
 ܴሺݐ, ߬ሻ ൌ෍െ logܣ௜ሺ߬ሻ߬ ൅
ܪ௜ሺ߬ሻ
߬ ݎ௜,௧
஼ூோ
ଷ
௜ୀଵ
 (B3) 
where ܴሺݐ, ߬ሻ represents the ߬-period spot rate at time ݐ, and ܣ௜ሺ߬ሻ and ܪ௜ሺ߬ሻ are given by  
 
Α୧ሺ߬ሻ ൌ ቈ 2ߛ௜݁
ሺఈ೔ାఒ೔ାఊ೔ሻఛ/ଶ
2ߛ௜ ൅ ሺߙ௜ ൅ ߣ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ሻሺ݁ఊ೔ఛ െ 1ሻ቉
ଶఓ೔಴಺ೃ
൫ఙ೔಴಺ೃ൯
మ൙
 
(B4) 
 H௜ሺ߬ሻ ൌ 2
ሺ݁ఊ೔ఛ െ 1ሻ
ሺߙ௜ ൅ ߣ௜ ൅ ߛ௜ሻሺ݁ఊ೔ఛ െ 1ሻ ൅ 2ߛ௜  
 ߛ௜ ൌ ටሺߙ௜ ൅ ߣ௜ሻଶ ൅ 2ሺߪ௜஼ூோሻଶ. 
 
where the ߣ௜ are constants. 
We assume that the insurer holds a bond fund with target duration ܦ that is re-adjusted at the 
beginning of each period to maintain that target value. The price ܤ of one unit of the bond fund 
evolves according to: 
 ܤ௧ାଵ ൌ ܤ௧ ⋅ ൥ ൫1 ൅ ܴ
ሺݐ, ܦሻ൯஽
൫1 ൅ ܴሺݐ ൅ 1, ܦ െ 1ሻ൯஽ିଵ െ ܴ
ሺݐ, ܦሻ൩, (B5) 
with ܴሺݐ, ߬ሻ being the spot rates from equation (A3). The bond fund pays annual coupons ܥ௧ାଵ given 
by: 
ܥ௧ାଵ ൌ ܤ௧ ⋅ ܴሺݐ, ܦሻ 
In addition to the bond fund, the insurer invests in stocks, with prices ܵ௧ evolving according to: 
 ܵ௧ ൌ ܵ௧ିଵ 	 ∙ ݁௥೟಴಺ೃା ௥೟ೃು ൌ ܵ௧ିଵ ∙ ݁௥೟಴಺ೃା ఓ ೃುାఙೃುௐ೟మ . (B7) 
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Here, ݎ௧஼ூோ	is again the short rate, and ݎ௧ோ௉ ൌ 			 ߤ	ோ௉ ൅ ߪோ௉ ௧ܹଶ is the stochastic risk premium (net of 
non-stochastic dividends) with constants ߤோ௉	and ߪோ௉ and a standard Wiener process ௧ܹଶ 
uncorrelated to ௜ܹ,௧ଵ . Stocks pay an annual dividend ܦ௧ based on a fixed dividend yield ߤ஽ : 
To calibrate the term structure model, we rely on historical data on US 3-month T-bills rates and US 
Treasury zero yields with maturities of 1 to 10 years over the period January 1988 to December 
2012.27 We set ܭ ൌ 3, as the a 3-factor CIR model provide the best fit to the data when compared to 
alternative parsimonious multi-factor specifications. Based on this data and model specification, the 
calibration approach presented in Chen and Scott (1993) produced the following parameter estimates 
(see Table B1), with  r୧,଴େ୍ୖ the initial factor value derived from the current term structure:  
Table B1: Estimates of 3-factor CIR Model 
࢏  ࣆ࢏࡯ࡵࡾ ࢻ࢏ ࣌࢏࡯ࡵࡾ ࣅ࢏ ࢘࢏,૙࡯ࡵࡾ 
1  0.0092 0.2576 0.0851 -0.2036 0.0000 
2  0.0014 0.3035 0.0708 -0.5642 0.0009 
3  0.0122 0.3108 0.1427 0.0655 0.0188 
Note: Estimates of the 3-factor CIR model based on data provided by 
Datastream. Source: Authors´ calculation. 
Stock price developments and dividend rates are calibrated to the S&P 500 Price Index and the S&P 
500 Dividend Yield Index over the same period (December 1981 to December 2012). This produces 
the following parameter estimates:	ߤோ௉ = 3.28%, ߪோ௉ = 16.5%, and ߤ஽  = 2.6%. The insurer’s asset 
allocation follows a constant mix strategy: the portfolio is rebalanced annually toward the targeted 
allocation when assets are sold to pay benefits to the annuitants. In case the stock exposure exceeds 
the target exposure, the insurance company sells a higher percentage of stocks to pay the benefits. 
When we use the calibration parameters of the asset model described above, we use the risk and 
return profiles of the asset model reported in Table B2: 
Table B2: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations of Capital Market Model 
 
Note: Mean, standard deviation and correlation of bond fund ௧ܸ, cupon ܥ௧, stocks ܵ௧, and 
dividends ܦ௧. Number of simulations = 10.000, Source: Authors` calculation. 
                                                            
27 Specifically, we use the following Datastream time series: FRTCM3M, FRTNY01, FRTNY02, FRTNY03, 
FRTNY04, FRTNY05, FRTNY06, FRTNY07, FRTNY08, FRTNY09, FRTNY10. 
 ܦ௧ ൌ ܵ௧ିଵ ∙ ቀ݁ఓವ െ 1ቁ, (B8) 
  ௧ܸ ܥ௧ ܵ௧ ܦ௧ 
Expectation (%) 2.30 4.21 7.89 2.63 
Standard Deviation (%) 11.67 1.66 18.10 - 
Correlation      
௧ܸ 1 0 0 0 
ܥ௧ 0.4498 1 0 0 
ܵ௧ 0.0300 0.0865 1 0 
ܦ௧ 0 0 0 1 
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Following Cairns, Blake and Dowd (CBD, 2006), the stochastic dynamics of the annuitants’ actual 
mortality rates ݍ௫௉ ≔ ݍሺݐ, ݔሻ at age ݔ and time ݐ are described by: 
where ݍݔ,ݐ are the single year death probabilities, Κݐሺ1ሻand Κݐሺ2ሻ are period mortality indexes and ݔഥ is 
the average age over the considered age range. To estimate future mortality rates, the period 
mortality indexes component Κݐሺ1ሻ and Κݐሺ2ሻ are forecasted using a bivariate random walk with drift: 
Here, ߤ஼஻஽ and Κݐ  are constant vectors, Σ is an upper triangular 2x2 matrix, and ߝ௧ is 2-dimensional 
standard normal random vector.  
We calibrate the CBD model to US mortality data from the Human Mortality Database.28 This 
produces the parameter estimates reported in Table B3:  
Table B3: Calibration of CBD Mortality Model 
݅  Κݐ  ߤ஼஻஽  Σ  
1  -10.9033 -0.0400 0.0719 0 
2  0.1011 0.0004 - 0.0010 0.0003 
Note: Estimated parameters of the CBD mortality model based 
on US mortality data for the human mortality database. Κ୲  the 
period mortality index, ߤ஼஻஽ estimated mortality, ߑ correlation 
matix Source: Authors´ calculation. 
 
  
                                                            
28 Specifically we use the U.S. Death Rates (Period 1x1), Males and Females, Last modified: 16-Nov-2012, 
Version MPv5 for the period 1933-2010. See http://www.mortality.org. 
 ݈݋݃݅ݐ	ݍ௫௉ ൌ ln ݍ௫,௧1 െ ݍ௫,௧ ൌ Κ௧
ሺଵሻ ൅ ሺݔ െ ̅ݔሻ ⋅ Κ௧ሺଶሻ (B9) 
 Κ௧ାଵ ൌ Κ௧ ൅ ߤ஼஻஽ ൅ Σ ⋅ ߝ௧. (B10) 
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Figure 1: Stylized Model of Participating Life Annuity with Payout Smoothing 
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     ሺ1 െ ݕሻ ∙ ܵ௨௨ 
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     ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ∙ ܵ௨ௗ
FU Price ܵ଴    ܰ ∙ ݕ ∙ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ ∙ ܵ௨ௗ
Annuity Payments 0     
Insurer‘s Reserves ܰ ∙ ሺ1 ൅ ݌ሻ ∙ ܵ଴    ܵௗ௨ 
     ሺ1 െ ݕሻ ∙ ܵௗ௨ 
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   ܰ ∙ ሺ݌ െ ݕሻ ∙ ܵௗ  ܵௗௗ 
     ሺ1 ൅ ݕሻ ∙ ܵௗௗ
     ܰ ∙ ݕ ∙ ሺെ݌ െ 1ሻ ∙ ܵௗௗ
      
 ࢚ ൌ ૙  ࢚ ൌ ૚  ࢚ ൌ ૛ 
Notes: Evolution of Fund Unit (FU) prices, annuity benefits, and insurer reserves over two periods if smoothing is applied. 
The number of individuals,ܰ, the smoothing factor ݕ, the two-year survival probability ݌, the initial price of the FU ܵ଴ , and 
the FU prices in the following periods ܵ௨, Sୢ, S୳୳, S୳ୢ, Sୢ୳	and ܵௗௗ,  with ܵௗ௨ ൌ ݀ ⋅ 	ݑ ⋅ 	ܵ଴. Source: Authors´ illustration; see 
text. 
 
 
Figure 2: Threshold Subjective Probability of Downward Jumps Necessary to Value Smoothing 
 
Notes: Participating Life Annuity (PLA) policyholder’s subjective probability ߨௗ∗  for a capital 
market downturn beyond which PLA payout smoothing is utility increasing for alternative 
levels of relative risk aversion (ߛ). Calibration: time preference rate: ߚ ൌ 0.96, 2-period 
survival probability: ݌ ൌ 0.8. Capital markets: Fund unit (FU) price may increase (decrease) 
by a proportional factor of ݑ	ሺ݀ ൌ 1/ݑሻ. Source: Authors´ calculations; see text. 
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Figure 3: Effect of Asset Allocation versus Valuation Method on PLA Policyholder Utility 
Panel A: Accounting Smoothing 
A1: FMV vs. HCV A2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method 
 
Panel B: Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing 
B1: FMV vs. HCV B2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method 
 
Notes: Utility equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA; in $000) that generates the same utility as a Participating Lifetime Annuity 
(PLA) with a guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 for alternative scenarios based on a time-additive CRRA 
utility function. HCV = Historical Cost Valuation, FMV = Fair Market Valuation. Calibration accounting smoothing, male 
age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference: ߚ ൌ 0.96; relative risk aversion: ߛ ൌ 5; GIR: 3%; 
mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to 
annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency 
reserve 0%. Calibration accounting and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text. 
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Figure 4: Effect of Asset Allocation versus Valuation Method on Insurer Profitability and Stability for a PLA Product 
Panel A: Accounting Smoothing 
A1: FMV vs. HCV A2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method  A3: Shortfall Probability of Corner Cases over Time 
         
 
Panel B: Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing 
B1: FMV vs. HCV B2: Asset Allocation vs. Valuation Method B3: Shortfall Probability of Corner Cases over Time 
                
Notes: Expected internal rate of return (IRR) and shortfall probability of a Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 for alternative scenarios. 
HCV = historical cost valuation, FMV = fair market valuation. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference: ߚ ൌ 0.96; relative 
risk aversion: ߛ ൌ 5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; 
solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency reserve 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. 
Source: Authors` calculations. 
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Figure 5: Effect of Alternative Valuation Methods on PLA Policyholder and Insurer Outcomes 
 
Panel A: Accounting Smoothing 
A1: Annuitants´ Perspective A2: Insurers´ Perspective  
 
Panel B: Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing 
B1: Annuitants´ Perspective B2: Insurers´ Perspective 
 
 
Notes: Figure A1 and B1 show the utility equivalent fixed life annuity (in $000) that generates the same utility as a 
Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with a guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 based on a time-additive 
CRRA utility function for alternative valuation scenarios. Figure A2 and B2 show the expected internal rate of return 
(IRR). OCI = other comprehensive income valuation, HCV = historical cost valuation, FMV = fair market valuation, US 
GAAP Default = bond valuation OCI and stock valuation FMV, NAIC Default = bond valuation HCV and stock valuation 
FMV. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference: 
ߚ ൌ 0.96; relative risk aversion: ߛ ൌ 5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds 
fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial 
contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency reserve 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency 
reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. Source: Authors` calculations; see text. 
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Figure 6: Impact of Surplus Sharing and Actuarial Smoothing on Key Outcomes 
 
 
Notes: Optimal utility equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA; in $000) that generates the same utility as a Participating 
Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with a guaranteed initial lifelong annual benefits of $10,000 based on a time-additive CRRA 
utility function, corresponding internal rate of return for alternative annuitant participation rates. HCV = historical cost 
valuation. Calibration, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA benefits: $10,000; time preference: ߚ ൌ 0.96; relative 
risk aversion: ߛ ൌ 5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 
years; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. 
Source: Authors` calculations; see text. 
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Table 1: Stylized Two Period Model of Participating Life Annuity(PLA) with Smoothing  
  
Annuitants’ Optimal
Smoothing Factor ࢟ 
(in %) 
Welfare Gains from 
Optimal Smoothing 
(in %) 
 
Insurers’ Gains from 
Optimal Smoothing 
(in %) 
  ߨௗ ൌ 0.2 ߨௗ ൌ 0.5 ߨௗ ൌ 0.2 ߨௗ ൌ 0.5  ߨௗ ൌ 0.2 ߨௗ ൌ 0.5 
Low Volatility Capital Market Scenario (ݑ ൌ 1.2) 
ߛ ൌ 2  0 9.1 0 0.8 0  0.8 
ߛ ൌ 5  0.7 14.5 0.01 4.9 0.1  1.3 
ߛ ൌ 10  11.9 16.3 3.6 9.9 1.1  1.5 
       
       
High Volatility Capital Market Scenario ሺݑ ൌ 1.3ሻ 
ߛ ൌ 2  0 13.0 0 1.7 0  1.7 
ߛ ൌ 5  13.1 20.7 0.3 9.5 1.7  2.7 
ߛ ൌ 10  18.1 23.2 10.0 16.8 2.4  3.0 
Notes: Annuitants’ utility-maximizing smoothing factor ݕ (in %), corresponding welfare gains for 
annuitants (percentage increase in certainty equivalent fixed life annuity), and corresponding gain for the 
insurer (in % of the PLA premium). Calibration, time preference: ߚ ൌ 0.96, 2-period survival probability: 
݌ ൌ 0.8. ߨௗ represents the annuitant’s subjective probability of a capital market downturn, ߛ represents the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Capital markets: Fund unit (FU) price may increase (decrease) by a 
proportional factor of ݑ	ሺ݀ ൌ 1/ݑሻ. Source: Authors´ calculation; see text. 
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 Table 2: Utility-Maximizing Asset Allocation and Valuation Methods  
for PLA Policyholder Having Alternative Levels of Risk Aversion 
 
Notes: Optimal utility equivalent fixed life annuity (FLA; in $) with respective asset allocation percentage and book value 
ratio for alternative calibrations of the time-additive CRRA utility function. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 
in 2013; initial guaranteed Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) benefits: $10,000; time preference: ߚ ൌ 0.96; relative risk 
aversion: low (ߛ ൌ 2), medium (ߛ ൌ 5), high (ߛ ൌ 	10); GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value 
$163,399); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency 
limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 0%; target contingency reserve: 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial 
contingency reserve: 5%; target contingency reserve 10%. Source: Authors` calculations; see text. 
 
Table 3: Impacts of Optimal Combination of Asset Allocation and Valuation Method on 
Internal Rates of Return and Shortfall Probabilities, PLA Policyholder Having Alternative 
Levels of Risk Aversion 
  
   Relative Risk 
Aversion  
Bond 
Percentage
HCV 
Ratio 
ܧሺܫܴܴ ሻ 
(in %) 
Shortfall 
Probability (in %)  
Accounting Smoothing  Low / ߛ ൌ 2 0 80 6.20 6.96 
  Medium / ߛ ൌ 5 40 80 3.61 1.58 
  High / ߛ ൌ 10 80 100 4.97 0.00 
Asset and Actuarial Smoothing  Low / ߛ ൌ 2 10 70 6.60 8.24 
  Medium / ߛ ൌ 5 60 70 4.85 0.75 
   High / ߛ ൌ 10 80 70 4.67 0.15 
 
Notes: Expectation of internal rate of return and shortfall probability in percent for the optimal utility-equivalent fixed life 
annuity for alternative scenarios. Calibration accounting smoothing, male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed Participating 
Lifetime Annuity (PLA) benefits: $10,000; time preference: ߚ ൌ 0.96; relative risk aversion: low (ߛ ൌ 2ሻ, medium 
ሺߛ ൌ 5ሻ, high ሺߛ ൌ 10ሻ; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value $163,399); bond fund duration: 10 
years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%; equity capital endowment: 4%; solvency limit 4%; initial contingency reserve: 
5%; target contingency reserve: 0%. Calibration asset and actuarial smoothing, initial contingency reserve: 5%; target 
contingency reserve 10%. Source: Authors` calculations; see text. 
 
  Accounting Smoothing  Accounting and Actuarial Smoothing 
Relative Risk Aversion 
 Bond 
Percentage 
HCV 
Ratio
Optimal Utility 
Equivalent FLA 
 Bond 
Percentage
HCV 
Ratio 
Optimal Utility 
Equivalent FLA 
Low / 	ߛ ൌ 2  0 80 15,533  10 70 14,159 
Medium / 	ߛ ൌ 5  40 80 12,881  60 70 12,283 
High / 	ߛ ൌ 10  80 100 11,783  80 70 11,469 
